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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In their appellee briefs, Appellee Candace M. Suitter ("Suitter") and the Guardian ad
Litem's office ("GAL") argue that Appellant Geri Pasquin ("Pasquin") did not marshal the
evidence in support of her arguments. This is not true. In challenging the findings of the trial
court, Pasquin, in her appellant brief, adduced facts that dealt with Pasquin's attempts to visit
with the minor child, showed that Suitter did not care about family disputes and indicated that
visitation with Pasquin would be beneficial. Further, the issues raised with regard to the GAL's
involvement in the case are proper on appeal, because at trial at the trial court level, Pasquin
objected to the GAL's lack of involvement in the case and requested that the Court interview the
minor child. The legal standard advocated by Pasquin and the possible result of the case being
remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings does not violate Suitter's constitutional right
because Grandparent visitation is a legal, constitutional remedy which Pasquin is entitled to seek.
The issue of whether Pasquin's appeal was defective due to a lack of final order has been dealt
with on summary disposition within this appeal, and thus is not proper in an opposition brief.
The arguments of Suitter on this issue should therefore be disregarded. Finally, there is no basis
upon which to award fees and costs to Suitter in connection with her having to respond to this
appeal, and thus Suitter's request for fees and costs must be denied.
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ARGUMENT
I. Pasquin properly marshaled the evidence in her appellant brief which supported
her challenges to the Trial Court's findings and ruling
In her appellant brief, Pasquin argues that the trial court failed to make afindingthat
Suitter's reason for withholding visitation was reasonable, and that the Court'sfindingthat
Paquin made only token efforts to see the minor child was in error. In support thereof, Pasquin
adduced facts indicating that Pasquin was never given a reason why visitation ceased, that Suitter
admitted that visitation stopped due to familial disputes about which Suitter did not care, and that
Suitter was okay with Pasquin visiting the minor child and thought it would be beneficial.
Further, Pasquin adduced facts demonstrating the efforts made by Pasquin to visit with the minor
child. What's more, Pasquin set forth the appropriate legal standards- that the evidence did not
support the trial court'sfindingsand that the factual findings of the Trial Court wrere clear error.
Therefore, it is simply not true that, as Suitter and the GAL contend, Pasquin did not
marshal the evidence. Pasquin stated her challenges to the Court's ruling, then supplied the facts
that supported those challenges and demonstrated how said evidence did not support the trial
court'sfindings.Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
(Suitter's contention that Pasquin's failure to provide an appendix harms her appeal is
without merit. In her docketing statement, Pasquin provided the memorandum decision and the
docket on the case. That, along with the record on appeal index, constituted the full record of the
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case).
Indeed, it is not Pasquin's contention that insufficient evidence was before the Court.
Rather, Pasquin's argument is that, given the evidence that was before the Court, the Court's
finding was simply in error. And, as stated, Pasquin has set forth the factual evidence which
contravenes the findings of the Court.
II. Pasquin's argument regarding the GAL's participation is proper because
Pasquin raised the issue at the Trial Court
Contrary to the argument of the GAL, Pasquin does not take issue with the GAL because
they did not provide enough evidence to help her side. Rather, the concern is that they did not
adequately investigate the case and give the Court a full report. The Court's decision was thus
based on incomplete GAL information.
What's more, again contrary to the GAL's argument, Pasquin did raise the issue of
objection to the GAL's level of participation at and with the Trial Court. Pasquin did not receive
the report and recommendation of the second guardian ad litem until the day before hearing.
Thus it was not until the trial that the issue of the GAL's involvement came up. Given the
incompleteness of the report, Pasquin asked the Trial Court to interview the minor child in order
to get a better impression of her views, to help fill in the blanks created by the GAL (see record
on appeal index page 55- from the May 31, 2001 hearing, at page 104, lines 17-25, and page 106,
lines 17-20). As a result, this issue of GAL involvement was preserved for appeal.
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III. The legal standard advocated by Pasquin does not violate constitutional
strictures, and Suitter's arguments therein should be disregarded
During the course of the trial court litigation, Suitter attempted to have the case dismissed
based on both the unconstitutionality of the Utah grandparent statute, Utah Code 30-5-2, and
based on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). These
motions were denied. Then, as Suitter points out, the evidence was heard and a decision
rendered. On appeal, Pasquin challenges this ruling and the findings that supported it by
contending that the ruling was contrary to the evidence. There is nothing unconstitutional about
this, or about what result may occur.
If this Court were to rule that the ruling and factual findings in support by the trial court
was error, and that the case be sent back to the trial court, no constitutional right of Suitter would
be compromised. Grandparent visitation is an available, constitutional remedy in Utah. Troxel is
a limited holding that has not invalidated grandparent visitation, and, most importantly, has not
invalidated it in this state. What's more, this issue of constitutionality was not argued by Pasquin
in her initial appellate brief, and Suitter has not filed her own appeal. Thus, discussion of this
issue is improper as it is not an issue on appeal and not an issue raised by Pasquin and requiring
response by Suitter.
As Pasquin has stated in various trial memoranda and at the trial itself, the laws on
grandparent visitation give great deference to parental rights and the parents right to choose.
However, the law does allow for grandparent visitation to be allowed where it would be in the
best interests of the minor child. See Utah Code 30-5-2. In this case, Pasquin argues that because
Suitter actually has stated that visitation would be okay (that is, is not on record as saying no
-7-

visitation can occur) that the Court's ruling is in error. Again, for this Court to find that the trial
court decision was in error based on the legal standard stated would not violate a constitutional
right. Grandparent visitation can be granted, in the right circumstances. Thus, Suitter's discussion
of Troxeland other states cases should be disregarded. (Similarly, Suitter's comments regarding
media coverage of this case, comments suggesting how Pasquin could have better presented her
case, commentary on the attitude of witnesses, pleas to Pasquin herself to take "no" as an answer
with dignity and decorum, speculation about Pasquin's motives , and general suggestions as to
how Pasquin should conduct herself with regard to the visitation issue should be entirely
disregarded. These "issues" were not brought up by Pasquin and do not even pertain to any
legitimate argument raised by Suitter. They are merely off-hand comments, apparently thrown in
to give Suiiter a forum to comment on the case in general, rather than stick to the legal, appealspecific issues).
IV, The issue of whether Pasquin's appeal was defective for lack of a final order has
already been dealt with, and Suitter's arguments herein on that issue should be ignored
Following the notice of appeal and docketing statement filed by Pasquin on this appeal,
Suitter filed a motion for summary disposition wherein she argued that the memorandum
decision, following trial, by Judge Nehring, was not afinal,appealable order under Utah R. App.
P. 10(a) (1). The Court of appeals, on October 17, 2001, denied the motion and ordered that the
issues raised therein be deferred pending presentation of the briefs and consideration of the
appeal.
Given this clear ruling by the Court of Appeals, discussion of this final order issue within
Suitter's appellee brief is not proper. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for summary
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disposition, and deferred any discussion of the issue until the briefs were completed. Don't
discuss the issue in your brief, the Court of Appeals was saying. Therefore, the discussion in
Suitter's brief on this issue should be disregarded and not considered in any way, shape, or form.
(In the event the Court herein does take up this issue, Pasquin will not burden the Court with a
re-hashing of her argument on this issue, but would simply refer the Court to her opposition
memorandum to the motion for summary disposition. Strangely, after arguing that a final order
was not entered in the case, Suitter states that she accepts the memorandum decision as the final
order, and later states that the memorandum decision is a clear, comprehensible and complete
conclusion to the controversy).
V. There is no basis by which Suitter is entitled to attorney's fees and double costs
under URAP 33- Pasquin's appeal is not frivolous but is made in good faith
Because, in Suitter's estimation, Pasquin and her attorneys should have taken "no" for an
answer and not tried to appeal the trial Court's ruling, and, presumably, because Suitter is a
mother with a young family, Suitter argues she is entitled to attorneys fees and double costs
under Utah R. App. P. 33. Why Suitter's status as a mother with a young family enables her to
costs and fees is not made clear. In any event, there is no basis for an award of fees and costs to
Suitter. Pasquin has brought this appeal in good faith, challenging the trial court's findings.
Pasquin's appeal is based on and is grounded in the facts of the case, which she contends merit a
reversal of the trial court's decision. The appeal is within the bounds of existing law. Therefore,
no award of costs and fees to Suitter is justified, and such request must be denied.
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CONCLUSION
Pasquin has brought this appeal in part upon the argument that the decision rendered by
the Trial Court did not comport with the facts adduced at trial. In support thereof, Pasquin has set
forth those facts- "marshaled the evidence"- which contravene the Court's order and the findings
that support it. Pasquin has properly set forth the legal standards, and thus has properly brought
appellate claims.
Pasquin's claims regarding the GAL's involvement in the case were properly preserved at
the time of trial and are proper appellate claims. At the time of trial, and not before, Pasquin
realized the incomplete nature of the GAL's involvement in the case. Pasquin noted to the Court
this incomplete involvement and, in an effort to help make up for it, asked the Court to interview
the minor child, since the present GAL had not done so. Thus, presentment of the level of
involvement of the GAL at the Trial Court level was a timely and proper appellate claim.
The legal standard set forth by Pasquin and the possible result of appellate reversal do nor
violate Suitter's constitutional rights. Grandparent visitation, based on appropriate factual
support, is a constitutional remedy provided by statute for grandparents in Utah. Thus, in arguing
for a reversal and to assert grand parent visitation rights, Pasquin is not infringing on Suitter's
constitutional rights. In addition, though raised by Suitter, such constitutional issues are not
issues on appeal, were not raised by Pasquin, and do not belong in Suitter's appellate brief. Such
discussion of these issues should be disregarded.
The issue of whether the memorandum decision by the Trial Court was a final, appealable
order has already been decided by the Appeals Court. This court denied the motion of Suitter for
summary disposition on this issue, and directed the issue deferred. Thus, is was improper for
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Suitter to raise the issue in her appellate brief, and any and all mention of this issue in Suitter's
brief should be disregarded.
Finally, Pasquin's brief was brought in good faith and was grounded in the facts of the
case. Therefore, there is no basis, and Suitter has set forth none, which would entitle Suitter to
receive costs and fees for having to respond to this appeal. Accordingly, the request for costs and
fees made by Suitter must be denied.
Pasquin respectfully requests that the Court overturn the Trial Court's ruling that
visitation by Pasquin of the minor child is not in the child's best interests, and remand the case to
the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent thereto.

DATED this 8th day of March, 2002.

, ,
Brian W. Steffensen
William J. Middleton
Counsel for Appellant
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